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Abstract
This essay argues that it is the machine that constitutes the symptom of ethics—
“symptom” understood as that excluded “part that has no part” in the system of moral
consideration. Ethics, which has been historically organized around a human or at least
biological subject, needs the machine to define the proper limits of the moral community
even if it simultaneously excludes such mechanisms from any serious claim on moral consideration. The argument will proceed in five steps or movements. The first part will define
and characterize “the symptom” as it has been operationalized in the work of Slovenian
philosopher Slavoj Žižek. Although Žižek appropriates this term from Jacques Lacan, he
develops the concept in a unique way that exceeds Lacan’s initial psychoanalytic formulations. The second and third parts will demonstrate how the machine constitutes the symptom of moral philosophy, showing how and why it comprises the always already excluded
element necessary to define the proper limits of moral subjectivity. The fourth part will
then consider two alternatives that promise, but ultimately fail, to accommodate this
symptom. And the final section will draw out the consequences of this analysis for ethics
and its excluded others.
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One of the persistent challenges of moral decision-making is determining exactly who or
what deserves ethical consideration. Although initially limited to “other men,” the practice
of ethics has evolved in such a way that it continually challenges its own exclusions and
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comes to encompass previously marginalized individuals and groups—foreigners, women,
animals, and even the environment. Despite these progressive efforts at inclusion or what
animal rights philosopher Peter Singer (1973) has called “liberation movements,” one thing
remains outside the community of legitimate social subjects—the machine. Traditionally
characterized as a mere instrument or “means to an end,” these technological artifacts have
been and remain the excluded other. As J. Storrs Hall (2001) explains, “we have never considered ourselves to have ‘moral’ duties to our machines, or them to us” (unpaginated). And
yet, despite this almost absolute categorical exclusion, ethics seems to need and to be unable
to do without these mechanisms.
This essay argues that it is the machine that constitutes the symptom of ethics—
“symptom” understood as that excluded “part that has no part.” Ethics, which has been
historically organized around a human or at least biological subject, needs the machine to
define the proper limits of the moral community even if it simultaneously excludes such
mechanisms from any serious claim on ethics. Consequently, the machine in general and
the automaton, or self-moving machine in particular, constitutes the other of the Other
that must be excluded in order to define the legitimate boundaries of the moral community
(e.g., who is and what is not considered to be a subject of rights and obligations).
The argument will proceed in several steps or movements. The first will define and
characterize “the symptom” as it has been operationalized in the work of Slavoj Žižek.
Although Žižek appropriates this term from Jacques Lacan, he develops the concept in a
unique way that exceeds Lacan’s initial psychoanalytic formulations. The second and third
parts will demonstrate how the machine constitutes the symptom of ethics, showing how
and why it comprises the always already excluded element necessary to define the proper
limits of moral subjectivity. The fourth part will then consider two alternatives that promise, but ultimately fail, to accommodate this symptom. And the final section will draw out
the consequences of this analysis for communication ethics and the excluded other.

A Symptom of the Symptom
Slavoj Žižek has been concerned with the concept of the symptom from the very beginning. In fact, “The Symptom” comprises the subject matter of the first part of his first book
published in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology (first published in 1989, second edition
issued in 2008). This text begins in a way that is rather characteristic of all Žižek’s writings—
with a statement from Jacques Lacan that seems, at first, to be counterintuitive: “According
to Lacan, it was none other than Karl Marx who invented the notion of symptom” (Žižek,
1989/2008, p. 3). And the two chapters that follow this statement, “How Marx Invented the
Symptom” and “From Symptom to Sinthome,” are designed to explicate and develop this
insight. In doing so, Žižek provides a characterization of the symptom that can itself be
considered symptomatic of Western metaphysics.
The word “symptom” is typically used to indicate a mode of indication. As Todd
McGowan (2014) explains for the entry “symptom” in the Žižek Dictionary, “the usual idea
of the symptom in both psychoanalysis and traditional medicine sees it as an indication of
an underlying disorder that some form of therapy (either analytic or medicinal) will attempt
to cure and thereby eliminate” (p. 242). Formulated in this way, “symptom” is understood as
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a sign that refers to and is the external manifestation or indication of something that is more
fundamental and often hidden from direct perception. We therefore commonly distinguish
the symptom from its underlying cause, and this common understanding not only adheres
to the standard formula of semiotics but is informed by an original ontological decision that
differentiates between mere external appearances and the more profound substance that is
its ultimate cause and referent. Characterized in this fashion, the usual understanding of
“symptom” can be accommodated to and explained by a metaphysical arrangement that
is at least as old as Plato. According to the standard account of Platonism, or what is often
called (not without controversy) “Plato’s theory of the forms,” appearances are nothing less
than symptoms of more substantial transcendental ideas, and the task of thinking is to learn
to penetrate or see beyond these mere external apparitions and gain access to the true form
and original cause.
For Žižek, however, the symptom is formulated in a way that is entirely otherwise.
“Symptom” is not the sign of some hidden kernel of truth that is more substantial or profound; it is the necessarily excluded other of the system that makes the system possible in
the first place. As Žižek (1989/2008) explains,
the ‘symptom’ is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own
universal foundation, a species subverting its own genus . . . a point of breakdown heterogeneous to a given ideological field and at the same time necessary
for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form. (p. 16)
For this reason, “symptom” possesses a “radical ontological status” (Žižek, 1989/2008, p. 81);
it is the constitutive part of a system that is necessarily excluded from the system as such.
Or as Žižek (1999) explains by way of a passage he appropriates from Jacques Rancière, it
is “the part of no part” (p. 188). The symptom, therefore, comprises the constitutive exception that “threatens the functioning of the system, even though it is the necessary product
of this same system” (McGowan, 2014, p. 242). It is a kind of unacknowledged (and always
already unacknowledgeable) excremental reminder that is necessary for something to produce itself and function as the system that it is.
This alternative conceptualization of the symptom—a conceptualization that is simultaneously dependent on Lacan’s work and beyond the circuit of its determinations—turns out
to be symptomatic of Platonism. And the fact that Žižek himself never actually acknowledges this as such is just one more symptom of the symptom. It is, in fact, only by excluding
this particular concept of the symptom (the very idea of the “constitutive exception”), that
Platonism can become what it is. One might recall that Socrates, as was described in Plato’s
Apology, explains and tries to defend his own efforts as a response to the Oracle at Delphi
(Plato, 1982, p. 21a). The Delphic temple, as is reported in Protagoras (Plato, 1977, p. 324b),
famously had two laconic statements inscribed above its gate: “Know thyself ” and “Nothing in Excess.” Although the latter has typically been interpreted as a call to moderation in
all things, it can also be read as the trace of the symptom, inscribed at the very gateway to
knowledge. In this way, the statement “Nothing in excess” may be interpreted as an exclusive operation, indicating that whatever might come to exceed the grasp of self-knowing
is to remain unacknowledged, unknowable, or nothing. Consequently, every attempt to
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demarcate the proper boundaries of a system and cordon off its internal workings from
what it is not, always and without exception, produces an exceptional externality that it
must deny—an absolutely other that is cast off, externalized, and remains nothing.

The Symptom of Ethics
If Žižek is correct, then the system of ethics must have its symptom, or better, its sinthome.
For according to Žižek, “each subject or system has one fundamental symptom that contains the key to its structure and holds this structure together. This fundamental symptom
is what Lacan calls the sinthome” (McGowan, 2014, pp. 242–243). And the sinthome—or
the “constitutive exception,” if one prefers to avoid psychoanalytic “jargon”—of the system
of ethics will have been the machine, and it “will have been” because the symptom arrives
not from the depths of the past but from the future (but more on this later, that is, in the
future.).
It was, we might say parroting Žižek, none other than René Descartes who invented
the symptom of modern science. This is because Descartes, in the course of developing his
particular brand of philosophical self-reflection, cordoned off the human from its others,
specifically the animal and the machine. In fact, Descartes executes this exclusion by associating the animal with the machine, introducing an influential concept—the doctrine of
the bête-machine or animal-machine. “Perhaps the most notorious of the dualistic thinkers,”
Akira Mizuta Lippit (2000) writes,
Descartes has come to stand for the insistent segregation of the human and animal worlds in philosophy. Likening animals to automata, Descartes argues in the
1637 Discourse on the Method that not only ‘do the beasts have less reason than
men, but they have no reason at all.’ (p. 33)
For Descartes, the human being was considered the sole creature capable of rational
thought—the one entity able to say and be certain in its saying, cogito ergo sum. Following
from this, he had concluded that other nonhuman animals not only lacked reason but were
nothing less than mindless automata that, like clockwork mechanisms, simply followed preprogrammed instructions.
Conceptualized in this fashion, the animal and machine were effectively indistinguishable and ontologically the same. “If any such machine,” Descartes (1988) wrote, “had
the organs and outward shape of a monkey or of some other animal that lacks reason,
we should have no means of knowing that they did not possess entirely the same nature
as these animals” (p. 44). Beginning with Descartes, then, the animal and machine share
a common form of alterity that situates them as completely different from and distinctly
other than human. [1] Despite pursuing a method of doubt that, as Jacques Derrida (2008)
describes it, reaches “a level of hyperbole,” Descartes “never doubted that the animal was
only a machine” (p. 75). The bête-machine, we can say following Žižek, is the symptom of
Cartesian thought. It is the necessarily excluded other of human rationality, and it is only
through this mechanism of exclusion and its exclusivity that the system of human rationality (and rationality as specifically defined by an act of self-knowing) emerges and functions.
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Following Descartes’s exclusive ontological decision, animals have not traditionally
been considered a legitimate subject of moral consideration. Determined to be mere mechanisms, they were nothing more than instruments to be used more or less effectively by
human beings who were typically the only subjects who mattered. When Immanuel Kant
(1985), for instance, defined morality as involving the rational determination of the will,
the animal, which does not by definition possess reason, is immediately and categorically
excluded. [2] The practical employment of reason does not concern the animal and, when
Kant does make mention of animality [Tierheit], he only does so in order to use it as a foil
by which to define the limits of humanity proper. The same exclusions have been instituted
and supported by subsequent works. According to Tom Regan, this decision also affects and
is apparent in the seminal work of analytic ethics.
It was in 1903 when analytic philosophy’s patron saint, George Edward Moore,
published his classic, Principia Ethica. You can read every word in it. You can
read between every line of it. Look where you will, you will not find the slightest
hint of attention to ‘the animal question.’ Natural and nonnatural properties, yes.
Definitions and analyses, yes. The open-question argument and the method of
isolation, yes. But so much as a word about non-human animals? No. Serious
moral philosophy, of the analytic variety, back then did not traffic with such
ideas. (Regan, 1999, p. xii)
Consequently, ethics, like any closed system, must have and cannot do without its
symptoms—the constitutive exception that although excluded from participation, necessarily make it what it is. This exclusivity is fundamental, structural, and systemic. It is not
accidental, contingent, or prejudicial in the usual sense of those words. “When it comes to
moral considerability,” Thomas Birch (1993) explains, “there are, and ought to be, insiders
and outsiders, citizens and non-citizens . . . ‘members of the club’ of consideranda versus the
rest” (p. 315). And because this exclusivity is systemic, little or nothing changes as moral
theory and practice has developed and matured over time. Even when membership in the
exclusive club of moral subjects has, slowly and not without considerable resistance and
struggle, been extended to previously excluded others, there have remained other, apparently more fundamental and necessary exclusions. Or to put it another way, every new
seemingly progressive inclusion has been made at the expense of others, who are necessarily excluded in the process.
Take, for example, innovations in animal rights. This rather recent development in
moral thinking, not only challenged the anthropocentric tradition in ethics but redefined
the club of consideranda by taking a distinctly animo-centric approach, where the qualifying criteria for inclusion in the community of moral subjects was not determined by some
list of indeterminate humanlike capabilities—consciousness, rationality, free will, and so
on—but sentience and the capacity to suffer. Although Jeremy Bentham is often credited
with introducing the innovation, the movement does not coalesce until the later part of
the 20th century. Tom Regan (1999) identifies the crucial turning point in a single work:
“In 1971, three Oxford philosophers—Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch, and John Harris—
published Animals, Men and Morals. The volume marked the first time philosophers had
collaborated to craft a book that dealt with the moral status of nonhuman animals” (p. xi).
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According to Regan, this particular publication is not only credited with introducing what
is now called the “animal question,” but launched an entire subdiscipline of ethics where the
animal (or at least some order of animal) is considered to be a legitimate subject of moral
inquiry.
What is remarkable about this development is that at a time when this other form of
nonhuman otherness is increasingly recognized as a legitimate moral subject, its other, the
machine, remains conspicuously absent and marginalized. Despite all the ink that has been
spilled on the animal question, little or nothing has been written about the machine. One
could, in fact, redeploy Regan’s critique of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (2005) and apply
it, with a high degree of accuracy, to any work purporting to address the animal question:
“You can read every word in it. You can read between every line of it. Look where you will,
you will not find the slightest hint of attention to ‘the machine question.’” Even though the
fate of the machine, from Descartes forward, was intimately coupled with that of the animal, only one of the pair has qualified for any level of ethical consideration. [3] Technology,
as Jean-François Lyotard (1993, p. 44) reminds us, is only a matter of efficiency. Technical
devices do not participate in the big questions of metaphysics, aesthetics, or ethics. They are
nothing more than contrivances or extensions of human agency, used more or less responsibly by human agents with the outcome affecting other human individuals. Consequently,
machines like computers, robots, and other kinds of mechanisms do not, at least for the
majority philosophical opinion, have an appropriate place within ethics. Although other
kinds of previously excluded others have been slowly and not without struggle been granted
membership in the community of moral subjects—women, people of color, some animals,
and even the environment—the machine remains on the periphery. No matter how automatic, interactive, or intelligent it might appear to be, the machine remains the excluded
other of the other—the constitutive exception of moral philosophy’s increasing attention to
previously excluded others.

Enjoy Your Symptom
Despite its exclusion from consideration, the machine has been and remains fundamental
to the system of ethics. In other words, moral theory and practice, although excluding the
machine from explicit consideration needs and depends on it for its own systematicity. All
too often, however, one misses this fact, because of the way we have (mis)understood and
restricted the definition of the machine. Typically, the word “machine” is understood and
characterized as a physical mechanism. “We have a naïve notion of a machine as a box with
motors, gears, and whatnot in it” (Hall, 2001, unpaginated). It is, for example, the springdriven mechanical clock, introduced in Europe around the middle of the 16th century,
which had comprised the principal machinic prototype for much of the modern period. For
Descartes, the mechanical clock, with its intricate gears, was a model of the mindless animal
body, which moves itself and responds to stimulus like a well-fashioned mechanism. In Sir
Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, this image was extended to
cover the entirety of physical reality, introducing a concept that has come to be called the
“clockwork universe” (Newton, 1972). Even after technology had advanced well beyond
the gears, springs, and levers of the clock, philosophers continued to fixate on mechanics. For Martin Heidegger (1977), for example, technology was restricted to mechanical
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apparatuses: sawmills, hydroelectric power plants, high-frequency radar stations, and jet
aircraft (p. 5).
This particular definition of the machine is not only restrictive but, as Hall (2001)
argues, “incapable of dealing with the machines of the future” (unpaginated). According to
Hall, a machine is not simply a combination of gears and motors. It is a set of rules, instructions, or messages.
The most important machine of the twentieth century wasn’t a physical thing at
all. It was the Turing Machine, and it was a mathematical idea. It provided the
theoretical basis for computers . . . This theoretical concept of a machine as a
pattern of operations which could be implemented in a number of ways is called
a virtual machine. (Hall, 2001, unpaginated)
Understood in this fashion, “machine” is not merely a collection of physical springs and
gears but a system of encoded instructions, an algorithm, which may be implemented and
embodied in any number of ways. This general definition of the machine covers mechanical
systems, like clocks that implement rules of synchronization in the form of physical space
marked out on rotating gears; biological systems, like animals and plants that are composed
of and operate by following instructions embedded in their genetic code; and information
processing devices, like the computer, which performs different operations based on various program instructions stipulated by software. As Donna Haraway (1991) has argued,
following the innovations introduced by Norbert Wiener, we are all understood and constituted as mechanisms of communication.
If the machine, according to this general definition, is a pattern of operations or a set of
pre-defined instructions, then ethics has been and continues to be mechanistic. According
to the English moralist Henry Sidgwick (1981), “the aim of Ethics is to systematize and free
from error the apparent cognitions that most men have of the rightness or reasonableness
of conduct” (p. 77). Western conceptions of morality customarily consist in systematic rules
of behavior that can be encoded, like an algorithm, and implemented by different moral
agents in a number of circumstances and situations. They are, in short, an instruction set
that is designed to direct behavior and govern conduct. Take for example, the Ten Commandments, the cornerstone of Judeo-Christian ethics. These ten rules constitute something of a moral subroutine that not only prescribe correct operations for human beings
but do so in a way that is abstracted from the particulars of circumstance, personality, and
other empirical accidents. “Thou shall not kill” is a general prohibition against murder that
applies in any number of situations where one human being confronts another. Like an
algorithm, the statements contained within the Ten Commandments are general operations
that can be applied to any particular set of data.
Similarly, Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is founded on and structured by fundamental rules or what he calls, in a comparison to natural science, “practical laws.” These
practical laws are “categorical imperatives.” That is, they are not merely subjective maxims
that apply to a particular person’s will under a specific set of circumstances. Instead, they
must be universally and objectively valid for the will of every rational being in every possible circumstance.
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Laws must completely determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I am
capable of achieving a desired effect or what should be done to realize it. They
must thus be categorical; otherwise they would not be laws, for they would lack
the necessity which, in order to be practical, must be completely independent
of pathological conditions, i.e., conditions only contingently related to the will.
(Kant, 1985, p. 18)
For Kant, moral action is programmed by principles of pure practical reason—universal
laws that are not only abstracted from every empirical condition but applicable to any and
all rational agents. It may be said, therefore, that Kant, who took physics and mathematics
as the model for a wholesale transformation of the procedures of philosophy, mechanized
ethics in a way that was similar to Newton’s mechanization of physical science.
Finally, even the pragmatic alternative to deontological ethics, utilitarianism, operates
by a kind of systemic moral computation or what Jeremy Bentham (1988) called “moral
arithmetic.” The core utilitarian principle, “seek to act in such a way as to promote the
greatest quantity and quality of happiness for the greatest number,” is a general formula that
subsequently requires considerable processing to crunch the numbers and decide the best
possible outcome. In fact, Michael Anderson, Susan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen
(2004) have not only constructed computer-based “ethical advisors” but argue that such
machines might have an advantage over a human being in following utilitarian theory,
because of the sheer number of variables that usually need to be taken into account and
calculated accurately (p. 2). For this reason, Joseph Nadeau (2006) has even suggested that
machines might be more moral, that is, less biased and more reasonable in executing moral
decision-making. In all these cases, ethics—which, according to Sidgwick (1981, p. 77),
aims to systematize human cognition and conduct—conforms to the characterization of
what is called “the virtual machine.” Commandments, moral imperatives, ethical principles,
codes of conduct, practical laws . . . these all endeavor to provide a clear set of instructions
or patterns of operation that are designed to program and direct human social behavior and
interaction.

How to Survive the Robot Apocalypse
The system of ethics is both dependent upon and exclusive of the machine. It comprises
that necessary part of moral thinking that morality wants no part of. And it is for this reason that it initially appears to us as a kind of external or alien threat. In fact, in the popular
imagination, the machine—a generic name that is, following Derrida (2008), admittedly as
problematic as the term “animal” (p. 23)—is often imagined as coming at us from another
time and place. The “machinic other” is typically portrayed in the form of an invading army
of robots descending on us from the outer reaches of space sometime in the not-too-distant
future. This particular representation is not accidental or a mere artifact of contemporary
popular culture. There is a good reason for it. As Žižek (1989/2008) explains “symptoms are
meaningless traces, their meaning is not discovered, excavated from the hidden depths of
the past, but constructed retroactively” from the future (p. 58). If the moral challenge of the
machine is typically imagined in terms of this popular sci-fi formula, it is because it constitutes the constitutive exception of moral philosophy and can appear to us—assuming that
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it does appear to us—only as a kind of external threat proceeding from the future. In this,
Deleuze (1994) was undeniably correct—philosophy is a kind of science fiction (p. xx). The
question then, is how do or should we respond in the face of this apparent robot invasion?
There are at least two alternatives situated on opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum,
neither of which is entirely adequate.

Moral Totalitarianism
One method of response, what we might call “moral totalitarianism,” is to develop a more
inclusive and complete moral system that can incorporate not just the machine but any
and all symptomatic others. Take, for example, Luciano Floridi’s (2013) proposal for a new
moral theory he calls “Information Ethics,” abbreviated IE. According to Floridi, efforts to
evolve moral consideration have been woefully inadequate insofar as each new innovation
cannot, it seems, succeed without making additional exclusions. Although he does not say
it in this exact way, what concerns Floridi is the symptomatic remainder of ethics. Animal
rights philosophy, he points out, correctly challenged the anthropocentric tradition. But it
succeeded only by further excluding other living organisms, like plants and the environment. As a result, the innovations of bioethics and environmental ethics sought to repair
this exclusivity by developing a moral theory that was more inclusive of these previously
excluded others. But, Floridi (2013) continues, even the innovations of
bioethics and environmental ethics fail to achieve a level of complete universality and impartiality, because they are still biased against what is inanimate,
lifeless, intangible, abstract, engineered, artificial, synthetic, hybrid, or merely
possible. Even land ethics is biased against technology and artefacts, for example.
From their perspective, only what is intuitively alive deserves to be considered
as a proper centre of moral claims, no matter how minimal, so a whole universe
escapes their attention. (p. 64)
IE is designed to respond to this exclusivity by developing,
an ecological ethics that replaces biocentrism with ontocentrism. IE suggests
that there is something even more elemental than life, namely being—that is,
the existence and flourishing of all entities and their global environment—and
something more fundamental than suffering, namely entropy, [which] here
refers to any kind of destruction or corruption of informational objects, that is,
any form of impoverishment of being including nothingness, to phrase it more
metaphysically. (Floridi, 2008, p. 47)
Following the moral innovations of bio- and environmental ethics, Floridi advocates
expanding the scope of ethics by altering its focus and lowering the threshold for inclusion, or, to use Floridi’s terminology, the “level of abstraction” (LoA). What makes someone
or something a moral subject, deserving of some level of ethical consideration, is that it
exists as a coherent body of information. “Unlike other non-standard ethics,” Floridi (2013)
argues that,
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IE is more impartial and universal—or one may say less ethically biased—
because it brings to ultimate completion the process of enlarging the concept of
what may count as a centre of moral claims, which now includes every instance
of information, no matter whether physically implemented or not. (p. 65)
The proposal certainly sounds promising. Like previous innovations and “liberation
movements” (Singer, 1973) in ethics, IE is interested in expanding membership in the moral
community so as to incorporate previously excluded others and eliminate the symptom of
ethics. But, unlike these previous efforts, it is arguably more inclusive, incorporating other
forms of otherness, like technologies, artifacts, and machines. But IE, for all its promise to
provide what one might call “a moral theory of everything,” still makes exclusive decisions.
As a system of ethics it too must have and cannot proceed without its symptom. And what
is excluded from this seemingly complete and all-encompassing moral theory is “nothing.”
[4] As if following the two laconic imperatives inscribed above the gate at Delphi, IE’s totalizing comprehension leaves only “nothing in excess.” But this “nothing” is not no-thing; it
is IE’s particular symptom. Consequently, the problem with efforts at fabricating increasing
greater levels of moral inclusivity, like that proposed by IE, is that they remain symptomatic.

Thinking Otherwise
The alternative to this moral totalitarianism proceeds and operates otherwise. And when it
comes to thinking otherwise, especially as it relates to questions regarding ethics, there is
perhaps no thinker better suited to the task than Emmanuel Levinas. Unlike a lot of what
goes by the name of “moral philosophy,” Levinasian thought does not rely on metaphysical
generalizations, abstract formulas, or simple pieties. Levinas (1969) is not only critical of
the traditional tropes and traps of Western ontology but proposes an ethics of radical otherness that deliberately resists and interrupts the metaphysical gesture par excellence, that is,
the reduction of difference to the same. This radically different approach to thinking difference differently is not a gimmick. It constitutes a fundamental reorientation that effectively
changes the rules of the game and the standard operating presumptions.
Levinas, therefore, deliberately turns things around by reconfiguring the assumed order
of precedence in situations regarding moral decision-making. For him, the ethical relationship, the moral obligation that I have to the Other, precedes and determines who or what
comes, after the fact, to be considered a moral subject or “person.” [5] Ethics, therefore, is
not predicated on an a priori determination of who or what is a legitimate moral subject.
Instead, moral standing is something that is first decided on the basis of and as a product of
a social encounter. According to Levinas, therefore, the Other always and already obligates
me in advance of the customary decisions and debates concerning who or what is and is not
considered a moral subject. This apparent inability or indecision is not necessarily a problem. In fact, it is a considerable advantage insofar as it opens ethics not only to the Other
but to other forms of otherness. “If this is indeed the case,” as Matthew Calarco (2008)
concludes,
that is, if it is the case that we do not know where the face begins and ends, where
moral considerability begins and ends, then we are obligated to proceed from
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the possibility that anything might take on a face. And we are further obligated
to hold this possibility permanently open. (p. 71)
Despite the promise this innovation has for arranging an ethics that is oriented otherwise, Levinas’s work is not, it seems, able to escape from the traditional anthropocentric
privilege. Whatever the import of his unique contribution, Other in Levinas is still (for
better or worse) unapologetically human. If, according to Levinas, previous forms of moral
theorizing can be criticized for putting ontology before ethics, then Levinasian thought can
be cited for its unquestioned philosophical anthropology. If Levinasian thought is to provide
a way of thinking that is able to respond to and to take responsibility for these other forms
of otherness, or to consider and respond to, as John Sallis (2010) describes it, “the question
of another alterity” (p. 88), we will need to use and interpret Levinas’s own philosophical
innovations in excess of and in opposition to him. We will need, as Derrida (1978) once
wrote of Georges Bataille’s exceedingly careful engagement with the thought of Hegel, to
follow Levinas to the end, “to the point of agreeing with him against himself ” (p. 260) and
of wresting his discoveries from the limited interpretations that he provided. Such efforts at
“radicalizing Levinas” (Atterton & Calarco, 2010) will take up and pursue Levinas’s moral
innovations in excess of the rather restricted formulations that he and his advocates and
critics have typically provided. “Although Levinas himself,” Calarco (2008) writes,
is for the most part unabashedly and dogmatically anthropocentric, the underlying logic of his thought permits no such anthropocentrism. . . . In fact, as I
shall argue, Levinas’s ethical philosophy is, or at least should be, committed to
a notion of universal ethical consideration, that is, an agnostic form of ethical
consideration that has no a priori constraints or boundaries. (p. 55)
This radical reorientation—or other version of Levinas’s ethics of otherness—obviously
opens the door to what some might consider absurd possibilities:
At this point, most reasonable readers will likely see the argument I have been
making as having absurd consequences. While it might not be unreasonable to
consider the possibility that ‘higher’ animals who are ‘like’ us, animals who have
sophisticated cognitive and emotive functions, could have a moral claim on us,
are we also to believe that ‘lower’ animals, insects, dirt, hair, fingernails, ecosystems and so on could have a claim on us? (Calarco, 2008, p. 71)
In responding to this charge, Calarco deploys that distinctly Žižekian strategy of “fully
endorsing what one is accused of ” (Žižek, 2000, p. 2). “I would suggest,” Calarco (2008)
argues,
affirming and embracing what the critic sees as an absurdity. All attempts to
shift or enlarge the scope of moral consideration are initially met with the same
reactionary rejoinder of absurdity from those who uphold common sense. But
any thought worthy of the name, especially any thought of ethics, takes its point
of departure in setting up a critical relation to common sense and the established
doxa and, as such, demands that we ponder absurd, unheard-of thoughts. (p. 72)
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Calarco’s reworking of Levinasian philosophy seems to provide for a more inclusive
ethics that is able to take other forms of otherness into account. And it is, no doubt, a compelling proposal. What is interesting about his argument, however, is not the other forms of
otherness that come to be incorporated through his innovative reworking of Levinas, but
what gets left out in the process. For all its promise to think ethics otherwise, Calarco’s radicalization of Levinas still has its symptoms. According to the letter of Calarco’s text, the following entities should also be included as potentially significant: “‘lower’ animals, insects,
dirt, hair, fingernails, and ecosystems.” What is obviously missing from this list is anything
that is not “natural,” that is, any form of artifact. Consequently, what gets left out by or
excluded from Calarco’s “universal consideration”—a mode of ethical concern that does
not shrink from potential absurdities and the unthinkable—are tools, technologies, and
machines. Although Calarco (2008) is clearly prepared, in the name of the other and other
kinds of otherness, “to ponder absurd, unheard-of thoughts” (p. 72) the machine remains
excluded and in excess of this effort, comprising a kind of absurdity beyond absurdity, the
unthinkable of the unthought, or the other of all who are considered Other. The alterity of
all kinds of other nonhuman things does, in fact, and counter to Levinas’s own interpretation of things, make an ethical impact. But this does not apply, it seems, to machines, which
remain, for Levinas, Calarco, and others, the excluded other of moral philosophy’s own
interest in otherness.

Summary and Conclusions
“Every philosophy,” Silva Benso (2000) writes in a comprehensive gesture that performs
precisely what it seeks to address, “is a quest for wholeness.” This objective, she argues,
has been typically targeted in one of two ways. “Traditional Western thought has pursued
wholeness by means of reduction, integration, systematization of all its parts. Totality has
replaced wholeness, and the result is totalitarianism from which what is truly other escapes,
revealing the deficiencies and fallacies of the attempted system” (p. 136). This is precisely
the problem with totalizing systems of moral inclusion, like Floridi’s Information Ethics.
For all its efforts at achieving a more inclusive form of inclusion, IE still makes a distinction
between inside and outside—between who matters and what does not—even if the symptom of IE is nothing. [6]
The competing alternative to this totalitarian approach is a philosophy of difference
that is oriented otherwise, like that proposed and developed by Levinas, Calarco, and others. This other approach endeavors to achieve moral completion,
by moving not from the same, but from the other, and not only the Other, but
also the other of the Other, and, if that is the case, the other of the other of the
Other. In this must, it must also be aware of the inescapable injustice embedded
in any formulation of the other. (Benso, 2000, p. 136)
For Levinas and those others who endeavor to develop this particular brand of thinking otherwise, every other has its other such that the process of responding to previously
excluded others is never fully complete. What is interesting about these two strategies is
not what makes them different from one another or how they articulate approaches that
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proceed from what appears to be opposite ends of the spectrum. What is interesting is what
they agree on and hold in common in order to be situated as different from and in opposition to each other in the first place.
Whether taking the form of a totalizing autology or an alternative kind of heterology,
both approaches “share the same claim to inclusiveness” (Benso, 2000, p. 136), and that is
the problem. We therefore appear to be caught between a proverbial rock and a hard place.
On the one hand, inclusion has never been inclusive enough. The machine in particular is
from the very beginning situated outside ethics. It is, irrespective of the different philosophical perspectives that come to be mobilized, not a legitimate moral subject. And even when,
at the apparent apex of moral inclusivity with the innovative efforts of IE, the machine can
be accommodated, this inclusion cannot succeed apart from instituting additional exclusions and marginalizations. On the other hand, alternatives to this tradition have never
quite been different enough. Although a concern with and for others promises to transform
the status quo in ethics, “thinking otherwise” has never been entirely adequate or suitably
different. Many of the so-called alternatives, those efforts that purport to be interested in
and oriented otherwise, have typically excluded the machine from the space of difference,
from the difference of difference, or from the otherness of the Other. Technological devices
certainly have an interface, but they do not it seems, possess a face or confront the human
user in a face-to-face encounter that would call for and would be called ethics.
The problem with both approaches is that they seek a utopian outcome. As Žižek
(1989/2008) explains, “‘utopian’ conveys the belief in the possibility of a universality without its symptom, without the point of exception functioning as its internal negation”
(p. 13). This utopianism, however, never succeeds. Each innovative effort at moral inclusion
produces a remainder. Each new system of ethics cannot help but generate its symptom.
Or as McGowan (2014) explains in a more politically situated context, “one cannot simply
expand representation to include them because some new excluded group will always come
to occupy this position” (p. 243). This is because the mechanism of exclusion is systemic
and has little or nothing to do with the actual “things” that are subjected to marginalization.
The exclusivity of the machine, therefore, is not simply “the last socially accepted prejudice”
or what Singer (1989) calls “the last remaining form of discrimination” (p. 148), which may
be identified as such only from a perspective that is already open to the possibility of some
future inclusion and accommodation. It is systemic and comprises the symptom of ethics.
Although Žižek does not necessarily provide a definitive solution to this impasse, he
does indicate what would be necessary for an alternative kind of eccentric moral theory,
called this because it would be an ethics without a clearly defined “center” as has been
the case for other moral theories like anthropocentrism, animocentrism, biocentrism, and
ontocentrism. Unlike Floridi, Levinas, and others, Žižek does not play the game of trying
to remediate the symptom of ethics by designing systems for greater inclusivity. Instead, he
proposes an ethics of the symptom, which would be not an(other) exclusive moral theory but
a moral philosophy of the excluded. He therefore proposes a community of moral subjects
consisting of nothing but a loose amalgam of excluded misfits, or what Alphonso Lingis
(1994) calls “the community of those who have nothing in common.” Though this proposal
can also be called “utopian,” it is a significantly different and somewhat distorted form of
utopia. Žižek, as McGowan (2014) explains, does not
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dismiss out of hand all utopian thinking. In fact, he constructs a utopianism
based on the symptom, a utopianism in which a community forms from the
exclude rather than through a universal inclusion. All those who exist outside
the system as its symptoms can come together in a universal solidarity. This solidarity would not involve any sense of belonging because what the subjects have
in common is only their exclusions or symptomatic status. (pp. 243–244)
What Žižek proposes, therefore, would be an eccentric community of eclectic elements
that does not simply oppose one form or method of inclusivity with another, seemingly
more inclusive form—the way that, for example, the ontocentrism of IE challenges the
exclusions of biocentrism or Calarco’s “radicalizing Levinas” questions the exclusivity of
Levinas’s philosophical anthropology. This eccentric form of moral thinking recognizes that
the real challenge for ethics is not figuring out a way to include others, but to identify and
confront the systemic exclusions of any and all efforts at inclusion as a significant and fundamental aspect of moral thinking itself. What we need to do in the face of the machine,
therefore, is not to try to formulate more inclusive forms of moral theory that can account
for and incorporate these others, but to recognize the symptom as such and allow it to
question the entire history of ethics and its necessary and unavoidable exclusions. This is
precisely that kind of thinking that Friedrich Nietzsche (1966) had called “the philosophy
of the future,” not only because the symptom of ethics, like the machine, appears to threaten
us from the future but because it points in the direction of a kind of thinking that is situated
beyond (the very system of) good and evil. This means that the challenge presented to us
by the machine is not just a matter of applied ethics; it invites and entrains us to rethink the
entire modus operandi of moral philosophy all the way down. This is the task for thinking
that is seen in the face or the faceplate of the machine [7].

Notes
[1] This modern innovation is also significant because it marked an important departure
from medieval practices whereby animals were thought to be capable of committing crimes
against human beings and put on trial for their transgressions. For more on this subject, see
Beirnes (1994), Chesterman (2021), Evans (1906), and Kadri (2007).
[2] The decision to focus on reason as a qualifying criterion for inclusion in the community
of moral subjects already hints at a potential problem and prejudicial exclusion. It is human
beings—those entities who have defined themselves as animal rationale—who have decided
that rationality (e.g., their own defining feature) is the exclusive qualifying characteristic.
Human beings, therefore, grant to themselves the power and the privilege to be both the
measure and measurer in matters concerning moral status. For more on this problem and
its consequences, see Gunkel (2012).
[3] For a more detailed investigation of points of intersection and divergence between
the “animal question” and the “machine question,” see Gellers (2021), Gunkel (2012), and
Hogan (2017).
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[4] One might ask (as was the case with one of the reviewers of this essay): Why is the exclusion of nothing ethically problematic? It is a very reasonable question and one that appears
to exonerate IE insofar as it could be said that this moral system is so complete in its efforts
at inclusivity that it excludes nothing. Although an accurate statement, this is not what is of
principal importance. What is important is that IE, like all other moral philosophies, still
cannot do without or escape from its symptom (e.g., the necessary and systemic exclusions
that are its condition of possibility). Because IE aims to be absolutely totalizing and inclusive of all being what remains excluded can only be nothing. This “nothing,” however, is not
no-thing. It is the symptom of IE. For a more complete analysis, see Gunkel (2012).
[5] This shift in focus has instituted what Coeckelbergh (2012) has called a relational turn in
ethics. Other formulations of a relational approach to moral status ascription can be found
in Abate (2019), Fox (1995), and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2017).
[6] Following this, we can say that the goal of justice is not and cannot be organized around
efforts to develop a more inclusive (or totalizing) ethics by eliminating (or pretending to
have eliminated) all that would have been excluded. Ethics is and cannot do without its
symptom. The question is not whether there is an exclusive remainder or not. Instead, what
matters is how a particular formulation of ethics responds to and takes responsibility for its
own necessary and unavoidable systemic exclusions. This is the task not of ethics per se but
of what Derrida (1978, p. 111) called “the ethics of ethics.”
[7] My own vision of ethics following from this line of reasoning has been developed and
presented in the books The Machine Question (Gunkel, 2012), Robot Rights (Gunkel, 2018),
and How to Survive a Robot Invasion (Gunkel, 2020).
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